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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Paul G. Beers*
This article focuses upon Virginia employment law between
June 1994 and May 1995.' Special topics, such as public sector
employment and unemployment compensation, lie outside the
scope of this article, as do developments under federal statutes.
In comparison with 1993 and the first half of 1994, when the
Supreme Court of Virginia set off a fireworks display of far
reaching decisions concerning employment relations,2 the
twelve-month period under review in this article was quiet. The
Supreme Court of Virginia issued relatively few decisions
concerning employment during this time frame. Lower courts
and the General Assembly were more active, particularly in
grappling with the supreme court's leading pronouncements on
the remedies available in tort to employees who are wrongfully
discharged, abused or defamed by their employers or co-work-
ers.
During the twelve months under consideration, three seminal
decisions from recent years by the Supreme Court of Virginia
were repeatedly applied in actions brought by employees. In the
area of contracts, the Supreme Court of Virginia's September
1992 opinion in Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols3 continued to
make it very difficult for an employee who lacks a formal, ex-
press contract to overcome the towering presumption that her
* Member, Glenn, Flippin, Feldmann & Darby, Roanoke, Virginia; B. A., 1980,
Trinity College; M..LA, 1983, Columbia University School of International Affairs; J.
D., 1986, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
1. Workers' compensation is discussed elsewhere in this volume. See, Wood W.
Lay and Bruin S. Richardson, Il, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Workers'
Compensation, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1199 (1995).
2. For an analysis of developments in Virginia employment law during 1993 and
the first half of 1994, see Paul G. Beers, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Employ-
ment Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007 (1994).
3. 244 Va. 337, 421 S.E.2d 428 (1992).
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employment is governed by the at-will rule.4 The absence of
breach of contract actions among the cases analyzed in this
article is largely attributable to Progress Printing and other
decisions favorable to employers by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia since 1987 concerning the at-will rule and statute of
frauds.5
While the law of employment contracts has undergone little
change since Progress Printing, the opposite is true in the torts
arena. The Supreme Court of Virginia's January 1994 land-
mark, Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems,6 dramati-
cally expanded the state court remedies available in tort to at-
will employees whose dismissals violate public policy. Much of
the activity in Virginia employment law since the winter of
4. Under the at-will rule, employment is presumed to be terminable without
cause. Nearly all jurisdictions in the United States recognize the at-will rule. The
United States is unusual among advanced industrial nations for its lack of legislative
protection against unjust dismissal from employment. Joseph Grodin, Toward a
Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 135, 136-37 (1990);
Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-
At-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583, 1625 n248
(1994).
In Virginia, an employee may rebut the at-will presumption in at least two
ways: by proving that the employer has agreed to retain him or her for a fixed peri-
od of time, or by establishing that the employer agreed unambiguously to fire the
employee only for cause. Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 340-41, 421 S.E.2d at 429-30.
5. See Graham v. Central Fidelity Bank, 245 Va. 395, 428 S.E.2d 916 (1993);
Falls v. Virginia State Bar, 240 Va. 416, 397 S.E.2d 671 (1990); Addison v. Amalgam-
ated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 236 Va. 233, 372 S.E.2d 403 (1988); Miller v.
SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
Last year courts handed down a few decisions concerning efforts by employers
to rebut the at-will rule. Like the employee in Progress Printing, these plaintiffs
failed in their efforts to show that they had an implied contract with the employer
protecting them against unjust dismissal. See, e.g., Nguyen v. CNA Corp. 44 F.3d
234, 240 (4th Cir. 1995) (granting employer summary judgment on plaintiffs claim
that personnel manual constituted implied contract); McBride v. City of Roanoke Re-
development and Hous. Auth., 871 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Va. 1994); Shepherd v. J.C.
Penney Co., No. CIv. A. 3:94CV335, 1994 WL 791574 (E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 1994); Deasy
v. Maryview Hosp., No. 92-846 (Portsmouth City Oct. 19, 1994). These decisions recite
principles set forth in Progress Printing rather than break new ground. For an analy-
sis of Virginia's position on the extent to which personnel handbooks may rebut the
at-will rule, see Paul G. Beers, Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols: The Fading Signifi-
cance of Employee Handbooks as Implied Contracts, 9 VA. B. ASS'N J., Spring 1993,
at 7, 7-10.
6. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994). For a discussion of Lockhart, see Beers,
supra note 2 at 1020-25.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
1994 has come in the form of judicial and legislative responses
to Lockhart.
Handed down within weeks of Lockhart, Middlekauff v.
Allstate Insurance Co.' is the third Supreme Court of Virginia
decision that strongly influenced the direction of Virginia em-
ployment law last year. As a result of Middlekauff, employees
have succeeded in pursuing intentional tort claims in the same
trial courts that before 1994 would have held these actions
barred by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act.8
I. THE PUBLIC PoLIcY EXCEPTION AFTER LOCKHART-THE
JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems9 widened the
public policy exception to the at-will rule. Ten years ago in
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,'0 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that at-will employees fired in violation of public
policy could sue their employers in tort for wrongful discharge.
In Lockhart, the supreme court held that at-will employees
fired because of their race or gender have a tort claim under
the public policy exception first recognized in Bowman."
Significantly, Lockhart applies regardless of the size of the
employer or the federal remedies available to the employee. The
Lockhart court acknowledged that victims of race and sex dis-
crimination who work for companies with 15 or more persons-
on the payroll have a federal cause of action under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The existence of overlapping or
parallel statutory remedies, the court reasoned, does not de-
prive wrongfully discharged employees of a common law claim
in state court, provided the employees can prove they were
fired in contravention of an established public policy.'"
7. 247 Va. 150, 439 S.E.2d 394 (1994).
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
9. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
10. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
11. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
12. Id. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 332 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988)).
13. Id.
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Most courts which applied Bowman and Lockhart in the
months under consideration continued to construe the public
policy exception to the at-will rule narrowly. In Mannell v.
American Tobacco Co., 4 Ginger Mannell claimed that she had
been discharged in violation of public policies expressed in the
Virginians with Disabilities Act ('YDA")5 and the federal Re-
habilitation Act of 1973.16 Mannell, however, did not comply
with the administrative filing requirements of either the Virgin-
ia statute or its federal counterpart.' 7 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment." The court conclud-
ed that the plaintiff could not bring a common law action under
Lockhart because the VDA declares that "[t]he relief available
for violations of this Chapter shall be limited to the relief set
forth in this section." 9 The district court in Mannell acknowl-
edged that the Lockhart court had permitted the employee to
proceed with her common law claim for breach of public policy
despite the availability of federal remedies under Title VII.2"
Mannell, in contrast, was relying upon a state statute that had
its own remedies. The employee had to take the bitter with the
sweet-she could not cite the VDA as the substantive basis for
her tort claim without also following its remedial procedures.2'
The reasoning of the district court finds support in pre-Lockhart
decisions by Virginia circuit courts, as well as in opinions from
other jurisdictions which recognize a public policy exception to
the at-will rule.22
14. 871 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1994).
15. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-1 to -46 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.
17. Both the VDA and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 have administrative
prerequisites. The VDA mandates that a claimant's action "shall be forever barred
unless such claimant or his agent, attorney or representative has commenced such
action or has filed by registered mail a written statement of the nature of the claim
with the potential defendant or defendants within 180 days of the occurrence of the
alleged violation." VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-46 (Repl. Vol. 1994). The Rehabilitation Act
establishes administrative remedies for disability discrimination against employers
who receive government assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1988). See also Khader v.
Aspin, 1 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing exhaustion requirement under the
Rehabilitation Act.).
18. Mannell, 871 F. Supp. at 862.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-46(D) (Repl. Vol. 1994); Mannell, 871 F. Supp. at 862.
20. Mannell, 871 F. Supp. at 862; see Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at
332.
21. Mannell, 871 F. Supp. at 862.
22. Prior to Lockhart, a few courts in Virginia had held that a discharged em-
1030
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In granting the employer summary judgment, the court
brushed aside the plaintiff's secondary contention that the VDA
was inapplicable. Mannell argued that the VDA does not apply
to employers, such as the American Tobacco Company, covered
by the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.23 "[I]f ATC is covered
by the Rehabilitation Act," the court responded, "plaintiffs
claim should have been brought under the Rehabilitation Act,
and she cannot maintain a state common law wrongful dis-
charge claim against ATC."'
Mannell at least arguably stands for the proposition that a
federal statute cannot serve as the source of public policy on
which to base a Bowman claim. The district court apparently
read Bowman and Lockhart to mean that the plaintiff must
locate an applicable state statute as the source of public policy.
One federal court has interpreted Bowman and its progeny in
this mannerY Other courts in Virginia26 and elsewhere,27
ployee may not bring a Bowman claim if she has another statutory remedy. See, e.g.,
Shields v. PC-Expanders, 31 Va. Cir. 90, 93 (Fairfax County 1993); Cauthorne v.
King, 30 Va. Cir. 202, 204-05 (Richmond City 1993); Pruitt v. Johnson Memorial
Hosp., 21 Va. Cir. 188, 188-89 (Washington County 1990). Outside Virginia, this issue
has arisen with some frequency in the discrimination context. Most courts in other
jurisdictions which have considered the issue have held that an employment discrimi-
nation claim under the public policy exception to the at-will rule is barred or pre-
empted when relief is available under state anti-discrimination statutes. Brad R.
Carson, Note, Labor Law: Tate v. Browning-Ferris Industries: Oklahoma Creates a
Common Law Cause of Action for Employment Discrimination, 46 OKLA L. REV. 557,
572 (1993) (collecting cases from various states for proposition that "most courts that
have considered the applicability of the public policy exception to cases of employment
discrimination have concluded that a claim under the exception should not be allowed
where relief is also available under statutes").
23. Mannell, 871 F. Supp. at 862. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41(F) (Repl.
Vol. 1994) (stating that the VDA "shall not apply to employers covered by the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973").
24. Mannell, 871 F. Supp. at 862.
25. Flinders v. Datasec Corp., 742 F. Supp. 929, 935 (E.D. Va. 1990) (remarking
in dictum that Bowman "thus far has been correctly limited to public rights embodied
in state statutes"); see also White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1550
(E.D. Va. 1990) (refusing to recognize a Bowman claim "based on the public policy
codified in Title VII"), affd, 939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991).
26. In Fielder v. Southco, 699 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Va. 1988), Judge Turk held
that a plaintiff who alleged that her employer had discriminated against her because
she was a woman could bring a breach of public policy claim under Bowman. The
court pointed directly to Title VII, rather than the Virginia Human Rights Act, as
the source of Virginia's public policy against sex discrimination. Fielder, 699 F. Supp.
at 578. See also Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1352
(E.D. Va. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim under Bowman by alleging
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however, have concluded that a discharged employee may bring
a common law tort action in state court under the public policy
exception to the at-will rule if the employee was fired in retali-
ation for exercising rights or discharging duties contained in
federal statutes. The Supreme Court of Virginia has not sig-
naled clearly whether an employee may rely upon a violation of
federal law as the basis for a Bowman action."
Like the district court in Mannell, the Circuit Court of Henry
County was unconvinced by a plaintiffs argument that federal
statutes can serve as the policy predicate for claims under Bow-
"he was discharged for his refusal to participate in an alleged illegal price-fixing
scheme . . . in violation of established public policy as expressed in 15 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq. and VA. CODE § 59.1-9.5").
27. Courts outside Virginia that have addressed this question have concluded that
employees fired in violation of federal statutes or regulations may bring a breach of
public policy claim against their former employers in state court, even when no corre-
sponding state statutes are implicated. See Hutson v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 860 F.
Supp. 6, 10 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding that under Massachusetts law federal statutes
can serve as the source of public policy for purposes of an action for discharge in
violation of public policy); Sorge v. Wright's Knitwear Corp., 832 F. Supp. 118, 120
(E.D. Pa. 1993) ("In Pennsylvania, public policies upon which wrongful discharge
claims may be based can have their source in federal as well as state law"); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 578-79 (D. Md. 1982) (recognizing a tort
claim under public policy exception by former employee discharged for threatening to
expose company's violations of federal tax laws), affd and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d
1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (allowing state law action based on violation of federal
price fixing statutes); Carter Coal Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 633 N.E.2d 202, 212
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (confirming that "Illinois recognizes congressional acts as a source
of public policy" that will support a wrongful discharge tort claim for employment dis-
crimination), cert. denied, 642 N.E.2d 1275 (IlI. 1994); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref.
Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing the Federal Clean Air Act as
an expression of state's public policy); D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 628
A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1993) (discussing the "decisions of this Court and other courts
that have found a wrongful-discharge cause of action when based on a clearly articu-
lated federal policy"); Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 536 A.2d 237, 238 (N.J.
1988) (finding mandate of public policy in federal employment discrimination law);
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1992) (holding that "a discharge
resulting from an employee's refusal to violate [federal customs] laws is actionable
under the public policy limitation").
28. Note, however, that in Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801, the plain-
tiffs cited their employer's breach of both Virginia statutes and federal securities laws
as the basis for their claim that they had been discharged in contravention of public
policy, a point underscored nine years later in Lockhart. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105-06,
439 S.E.2d at 332 (observing that in Bowman, "the former employees specifically
alleged, among other things, that the proxy statement the board of directors prepared
and mailed to each stockholder of record was false and misleading in violation of
federal securities laws and laws of Virginia").
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man and Lockhart. In Riddle v. Tultex Corporation,29 the
plaintiff brought a Lockhart claim against Tultex Corporation in
the Circuit Court of Henry County for gender and pregnancy
discrimination after she was terminated while on maternity
leave. The court, ruling upon the employer's demurrer, held
that the plaintiff had stated a common law cause of action for
sex discrimination under Lockhart, but dismissed the plaintiffs
pregnancy discrimination count."0 The Virginia Human Rights
Act3 ' renders "sex" discrimination a violation of the
Commonwealth's public policy, without mentioning discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy." The plaintiff argued that Ti-
tle VII, which expressly declares pregnancy discrimination to be
a form of sex discrimination, could serve as the requisite dec-
laration of public policy, even in the absence of a parallel Vir-
ginia statute." The circuit court declined to accept the
29. Riddle v. Tultex Corp., Law No. CL94-284 (Henry County Cir. Ct. Feb. 7,
1995). The author was counsel for the plaintiff in Riddle, which ended in settlement.
30. Id. slip op. at 2.
31. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-715 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
32. Id. § 2.1-715.
33. Despite the circuit court's ruling, a strong statutory argument exists that
pregnancy discrimination is unlawful under the Virginia Human Rights Act, which
incorporates by reference Congress' prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy. Section 2.1-716 of the Virginia Code . .. which is part of the Virginia
Human Rights Act, provides, "[clonduct which violates Virginia or any federal statute
or regulation governing discrimination on the basis of... sex ... shall be an 'un-
lawful discriminatory practice' for the purposes of this chapter." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
716 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Since 1978, Congress has explicitly termed pregnancy discrimi-
nation a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (codify-
ing the Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978 and defining "on the basis of sex" to include
pregnancy discrimination for purposes of Title VII).
Courts in other jurisdictions interpreting state human rights acts similar to
Virginia's have determined that those statutes prohibit pregnancy-based discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Frank's Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 365
S.E.2d 251, 256 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that the West Virginia Human Rights Act's
prohibition against sex discrimination prohibited pregnancy discrimination, despite its
lack of a specific reference to "pregnancy"); Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, 804
F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that discharging an employee because of
pregnancy is a violation of Maryland's public policy, as expressed in its state human
rights act which prohibits sex discrimination); Gallo v. John Powell Chevrolet, 765
F.Supp. 198, 209 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (equating pregnancy discrimination with "sex" dis-
crimination under Pennsylvania's human rights act); Merrell v. All Seasons Resorts,
720 F. Supp. 815, 819 (C.D. Cal. 1989); O'Laughlin v. Pinchback, 579 So. 2d 788, 792
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Broomfield v. Lundell, 767 P.2d 697, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989); Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358, 1365 (Colo.
1988). But see Hughes v. Matthews, 986 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
Arkansas would refuse to recognize a wrongful discharge action based on pregnancy
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plaintiffs theory that a violation of a federal statute such as
Title VII was a sufficient basis for a Bowman-Lockhart claim.'
Riddle is interesting also because the circuit court held that
employees protected by contracts of employment may bring
Bowman and Lockhart claims to the same extent as at-will
employees. 5 In 1989, the Circuit Court of Fairfax County held
that only at-will employees may bring Bowman claims, essen-
tially because this tort was recognized as a narrow exception to
the at-will rule. 6 Similarly, courts in a very few states, most
notably Missouri, have agreed with employers that unionized
workers and other contractual employees cannot bring tort
claims for wrongful discharge in breach of public policy. 7 Con-
tractual employees are limited to contract remedies in this
minority view. Most of the small number of courts that have
addressed this issue have agreed with the Circuit Court of Hen-
ry County in Riddle that no public policy is furthered by afford-
ing at-will employees the full panoply of damages recoverable in
tort, while restricting employees who are not at-will to the
more limited types of relief available in breach of contract actions."
discrimination); Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (hold-
ing that the absence of Georgia statute prohibiting pregnancy discrimination preclud-
ed the court from recognizing a public policy exception to the at-will rule).
34. Riddle, slip op. at 2.
35. Id. slip op. at 3.
36. Gulledge v. Dyncorp, Inc., 24 Va. Cir. 538, 542 (Fairfax County 1989).
37. At least two decisions indicate that the Missouri public policy exception to the
at-will rule does not afford a tort cause of action to contractual employees: Komm v.
McFliker, 662 F. Supp. 924, 924-25 (W.D. Mo. 1987) and Luethans v. Washington
University, 838 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (dictum). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has both followed and criticized these deci-
sions. Egan v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 23 F.3d 1444, 1447 & rL3 (8th Cir. 1994);
see also Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 581 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Mass. 1991)
(implying that only at-will employees can sue to recover for discharges in violation of
public policy).
38. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 960 (Utah 1992) (holding
that "the tort of discharge in violation of public policy should be available to all em-
ployees, regardless of their contractual status"); accord Childers v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 881 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying Maryland law); Her-
ring v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 123-24 (3rd Cir. 1986); Norris v. Hawai-
ian Airlines, 842 P.2d 634, 645 (Haw. 1992) (rejecting employer's argument that "the
state tort claim for discharge in violation of public policy is limited to at-will employ-
ees and does not extend to unionized employees who are protected by a 'mandatory
grievance arbitration procedure and just cause standard for termination'), affd, 114
S. Ct. 2239 (1994); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-84 (MII.
1984) ("[Tlhere is no reason to afford a tort remedy to at-will employees but to limit
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Virginia circuit courts also have differed with one another on
whether an employee must be actually discharged before she
has standing to assert Bowman-Lockhart claims. In Jones v.
Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc.,9 the plaintiff alleged
that over a period of several weeks her general manager had
touched her repeatedly and called her "honey." Although the
general manager stopped these practices when the employee
complained, the plaintiffs hours were reduced and her working
conditions deteriorated.' Ultimately, the employee resigned
and sued the employer for wrongful constructive discharge in
breach of public policy.4'
The Circuit Court of Virginia Beach awarded the employer
summary judgment.42 The court reasoned that the supreme
court had whittled a slender exception to the at-will rule in
Bowman to prevent employers from abusing their freedom to
terminate employees. "It is only when the employer actually
terminates the employee in violation of some established public
policy that the narrow exception is applied," the circuit court
wrote.' After reviewing Bowman and other decisions, the cir-
cuit court in Jones observed, "In no case did the employee re-
sign and then pursue an action for wrongful discharge, as the
Plaintiff in this case did."'
union members to contractual remedies under their collective bargaining agree-
ments .... The public policy against retaliatory discharges applies with equal force
in both situations") (citations omitted), cert. denied 474 U.S. 909 (1985); Ewing v.
Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. 1988) ("it would be illogical to deny the con-
tract employee access to the courts equal to that afforded the at will employee"); K
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1369 & n.5 (Nev. 1987); Lepore v. National
Tool and Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296, 1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), affd, 557
A.2d 1371 (N.J. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989).
39. Jones v. Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 458 (Va. Beach
1995).
40. Id. at 458-59.
41. Id. at 459.
42. Id. at 464.
43. Id. at 460-61. Accord Reed v. Cardiolog Assocs., Law No. 93-1481 (Portsmouth
City Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 1994).
44. Jones, 35 Va. Cir. at 460-61. The circuit court proceeded to find that even if
a plaintiff could bring a constructive discharge action under Lockhart, the plaintiffs
allegations failed to satisfy the stringent test for constructive discharge applied by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Title VII actions. Id. at 460.
This test for constructive discharge has two steps. First, a plaintiff must show that
her working conditions have become intolerable. Second, the employer must have
intended to force the employee to quit. Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343,
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The Circuit Court of Virginia Beach was probably incorrect in
its ruling that constructively discharged employees cannot as-
sert Bowman-Lockhart claims. Wright v. Donnelly,4" which was
consolidated on appeal with Lockhart, was a claim by an em-
ployee who resigned due to sexual harassment and then sued
her employer on a constructive discharge theory for breach of
public policy.' The Supreme Court of Virginia, without com-
ment, treated Wright's suit as a wrongful discharge action on
appeal.47
0
In Ludwig v. T2 Medical,48 the employee, Ludwig, filed a
Lockhart claim against her employer after she had resigned.
The Circuit Court of Fairfax County remarked, "[t]he Court
infers that Ludwig resigned but is claiming that the discharge
meets the requirements of' Bowman.49 Ludwig alleged that she
had informed company officials that her immediate supervisor
was embezzling funds.50 In retaliation for this whistleblowing,
the employer demoted Ludwig and told her to resign within two
months in exchange for severance pay.5  Overruling the
defendant's demurrer, the court held that Ludwig had alleged a
claim under Bowman and Lockhart.52
1350 (4th Cir. 1995); Paroline v. Unisys Corp. 879 F.2d 100, 108 (4th Cir. 1989);
dissenting opinion adopted en banc, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Bristow v. Daily
Press, 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); Wilder v. Southeastern Pub. Serv. Auth.,
869 F. Supp. 409, 414 (E.D. Va. 1994); Jolly v. Northern Telecom, 766 F. Supp. 480
(E.D. Va. 1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
held that an employee alleging the employer's sexual harassment led to a constructive
discharge need not prove that the employer specifically and consciously intended to
force a resignation. Instead, a plaintiff proceeding on a constructive discharge theory
may satisfy the Paroline "intent to force a resignation" requirement by showing her
resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer's sexual mis-
treatment. Martin, 48 F.3d at 1355; see Trout v. Charcoal Steak House, 835 F. Supp.
899, 902 (W.D. Va. 1993); Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 3
F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1993). Martin should prove helpful to plaintiffs in sexual
harassment cases, since often an employer bent on harassing an employee may wish
to retain the employee on the payroll so that the employer can continue to abuse the
employee. Martin, 48 F.3d at 1343.
45. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
46. Wright v. Donnelly & Co., 28 Va. Cir. 185, 187 (Loudoun County 1992).
47. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 102, 439 S.E.2d at 330.
48. 34 Va. Cir. 65 (Fairfax County 1994).
49. Id. at 66.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 67.
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In Allen v. Jenkins,3 the employer argued that a federal
statute immunized it against a plaintiff's Lockhart claim.
Wallace Allen alleged that First Union National Bank of
Virginia's president unjustly dismissed him as senior vice presi-
dent because of his race and age.' First Union and its presi-
dent demurred, asserting that Allen's Lockhart claim was
barred by the National Bank Act of 1864."5 Under this federal
statute, a national bank is entitled to some measure of inmuni-
ty" from a wrongful discharge action filed by an officer dis-
missed by the bank's board of directors. The question presented
to the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke was whether the
immunity extended by the National Bank Act was sufficiently
broad to shield First Union from liability to an officer whom it
had fired in breach of Virginia's public policy.5"
In a detailed letter opinion, Judge Weckstein ruled that the
court need not resolve that issue." The immunity granted by
the National Bank Act never attached, the court concluded,
because Allen was dismissed by First Union's president, rather
53. Allen v. Jenkins, No. CL94000650 (Cir. Ct. Roanoke City May 3, 1995).
54. Id. slip op. at 1.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (cited in Allen, slip op. at 1).
56. Courts differ on the extent of this immunity. See infra note 60. The National
Bank Act provides that national banks have the power to elect or appoint directors,
and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other
officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dis-
miss such officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
57. Allen, slip op. at 2.
58. Id. slip op. at 12. The "dismiss at pleasure" language of the National Bank
Act is very similar to corresponding provisions in the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 341 (1988), and the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1988).
Several courts have held that one or more of these three federal banking statutes
preempt state law wrongful discharge claims, both in tort and contract. See, e.g.,
Andrews v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 220 (4th Cir. 1993); Mackey v.
Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1989); Ana Leon T. v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987), reh'g
denied, 484 U.S. 1083 (1988); City Natl Bank v. Brown, 599 So. 2d 787, 790 (La. Ct.
App. 1992); Alfano v. First Nat'l Bank, 490 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
Webber v. First Fed. Bank, 523 N.W.2d 720, 722 (S.D. 1994). Other courts, however,
have held that these statutes and the regulations implementing them do not preempt
state law wrongful discharge claims. See, e.g., Hall v. Great W. Bank, 282 Cal. Rptr.
640, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Cole v. Carteret Say. Bank, 540 A.2d 923, 926 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Sav. & Loan, 792 P.2d
631, 638 (Wyo. 1990); see also Rohde v. First Deposit Nat'l Bank, 497 A.2d 1214,
1216 (N.H. 1985).
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than by the bank's board of directors.59 Overruling First
Union's demurrer, Judge Weckstein predicted that the Supreme
Court of Virginia would side with those courts which have con-
cluded that the National Bank Act provides immunity only
when the board of directors discharges the officer.6°
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AFTER LOCKHART-THE
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Following a full-throttle lobbying campaign by the Virginia
Chamber of Commerce and other business groups seeking to
have Lockhart overruled legislatively, the General Assembly
adopted Senate Bill No. 1025 during its 1995 legislative ses-
sion.6 The bill, which amends section 2.1-725 of the Virginia
Human Rights Act, creates a statutory cause of action in state
court for certain employees "discharged on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin or sex, or age if the employee is
forty years or older." 2 Discharges on the basis of disability are
not actionable.63
59. Allen, slip op. at 2.
60. Allen, slip op. at 6. The court acknowledged that "there is something of a
conflict among the authorities about whether the shield of the National Bank Act is
available to a bank when an officer is terminated by another officer, rather than by
action of the board of directors." Id. In deciding that the immunity of the bank's
board of directors is nondelegable, the court relied upon decisions such as Wells
Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 811 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Cal. 1991), and Sargent v. Cen-
tral Natl Bank & Trust Co., 809 P.2d 1298, 1305 (Okla. 1991), and rejected compet-
ing case law, such as Mahoney v. Crocker Natl Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287, 292 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Besides S.B. 1025, only two other
bills fall within the scope of this article. The General Assembly amended and reenact-
ed §§ 40.1-1 and 40.1-51.1 of the Virginia Code to require employers to "report to the
Virginia Department of Labor and Industry within eight hours any work-related inci-
dent resulting in a fatality or in the in-patient hospitalization of three or more per-
sons." VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1995). Prior to this amendment, the
statutes mandated that employers report within 48 hours any accident resulting in a
fatality or hospitalization of five or more persons. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1, 40.1-51.1
(Repl. Vol. 1994). The legislature also amended and reenacted § 32.1-36 to permit the
commissioner of health to reveal, to the extent permitted by law, the name and dis-
ease of a person to his or her employer, provided the employee's job duties meet
certain criteria. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-36(D) (Cum. Supp. 1995). The bill provides for
penalties against any employer who makes an unauthorized disclosure of this infor-
mation concerning the employee. Id.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
63. The Virginia Human Rights Act refers to discrimination on the bases of dis-
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Although section 2.1-725 establishes a cause of action directly
under the Virginia Human Rights Act, this legislation is de-
signed to restrict Lockhart in at least two respects. First, the
new cause of action is available only if the employer has more
than five but fewer than fifteen employees." Under Lockhart,
all employers, regardless of size, are subject to liability in tort
if they discharge an employee because of her race, gender or
other protected status.65 The apparent purpose of this statuto-
ry amendment is to immunize all employers, other than firms
which have at least six but no more than fourteen employees,
from discrimination actions under the public policy exception to
the at-will rule."
A second restriction built into section 2.1-725 concerns the
relief plaintiffs may seek for discriminatory discharges. Recover-
able damages are limited to "up to twelve months' back pay,"
plus interest. 7 While the court may order that up to twenty-
ability and marital status as unlawful discriminatory practices, but provides no reme-
dy for these forms of discrimination. Id. Section 2.1-725 provides a cause of action
only to employees who are discharged on the basis of their race, gender or other
protected status. The statute does not refer to discrimination in hiring or promotion
practices. Virginia courts have neither recognized nor rejected a Bowman-Lockhart
claim for discriminatory failure to hire or promote.
Whether the amended statute prevents public employees or employees of gov-
ernment contractors fired on the basis of their race or gender from bringing Lockhart
claims is not clear. The Virginia Constitution and several statutes prohibit govern-
ment employers, regardless of size, from discriminating on the basis of sex or race.
See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (declaring "that the right to be free from any gov-
ernmental discrimination upon the basis of religious conviction, race, color, sex, or
national origin shall not be abridged"); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-48.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989)
(prohibiting constitutional officers from discriminating in employment); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.1-116.10 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (declaring that the public policy of the Commonwealth
is "to provide equal employment opportunity to applicants and employees of the Com-
monwealth . . . without regard to race, color . . . sex or age"). Government employees
may argue that they can base a Lockhart claim on the public policies framed in
these statutes rather than the Virginia Human Rights Act. Employees of firms that
secure contracts with state or local governments also can point to laws other than
the Virginia Human Rights Act which express the Commonwealth's public policy
against employment discrimination. See VA. CODE ANN. § 11-51 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
65. Id. § 2.1-725.
66. Id. § 2.1-725(B). The legislation does not declare that Lockhart is disapproved
or overruled. Still, the amended statute provides that "[clauses of action based upon
the public policies reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those ac-
tions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or state civil
rights statutes or local ordinances." Id. § 2.1-725(D).
67. Id. § 2.1-725(C). However, the amended statute also provides that "if the
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five percent of the judgment be paid to the plaintiffs lawyer as
attorney's fees, any fees must be deducted from the back pay
awarded to the lawyer's client. 8 The amended statute disal-
lows all other types of compensatory damages recoverable in
many intentional tort actions, such as front pay and compensa-
tion for emotional suffering.69 Punitive damages and reinstate-
court finds that either party engaged in tactics to delay resolution of the complaint,
it may (i) diminish the award or (ii) award back pay to the date of judgment without
regard to the twelve-month limitation." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Bowman remains very much alive despite this statutory amendment.
Whether the amendment eviscerates Lockhart is open to question, particularly with
respect to plaintiffs who work for companies that have more than fourteen employees
or less than six. When the Supreme Court of Virginia issued Lockhart the statute
already provided that,
Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create, an
independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions. Nor shall
the policies or provisions of this chapter be construed to allow tort ac-
tions to be instituted instead of or in addition to the current statutory
actions for unlawful discrimination.
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
Despite this language, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Lockhart held that
employees discharged on account of their race or gender could bring causes of action
under the public policy exception to the at-will rule. "Here, we do not rely upon the
Virginia Human Rights Act to create new causes of action. Rather, we rely solely on
the narrow exception that we recognized in 1985 in Bowman, decided two years be-
fore the enactment of the Virginia Human Rights Act." Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439
S.E.2d at 331. (emphasis added).
The General Assembly's amendment of the Virginia Human Rights Act may
have failed to curtail Lockhart because the Supreme Court of Virginia did not rely
specifically upon the Act when it held that race and sex discrimination is inimical to
public policy. This assessment of Lockhart finds support in a few jurisdictions outside
Virginia which have recognized that at-will employees fired in violation of fundamen-
tal, widely recognized norms may sue their former employers in tort even in the
absence of any state statute which directly expresses that public policy. See, e.g.,
Verduzco v. General Dynamics Co., 742 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (recogniz-
ing "a public policy that is not based on or derived from a statute"); Painter v.
Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994); Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank Ltd., 879 P.2d
1288, 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589 (Vt. 1986)
(age discrimination). A small number of other courts have recognized a common law
action for discriminatory discharge even though the state has a human rights act
purporting to define the remedies available to terminated employees. Much like the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Lockhart, some of these courts point out that the public
policy against discrimination preceded passage of the state's human rights act. See,
e.g., Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843 F.2d 359, 365 (9th Cir. 1988);
Broomfield v. Lundell, 767 P.2d 697, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Holmes v. Haughton
Elevator Co., 272 N.W.2d 550, 551 (Mich. 1978); Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest
Partners, 805 P.2d 723, 725 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258,
1262 (Wash. 1990). But see, e.g., Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, 679 F. Supp.
991, 993 (D. Haw. 1988); Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F. Supp. 1191, 1212
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ment also are excluded." Thus the relief available to the select
class of employees afforded a cause of action under section 2.1-
725 is far more restricted than the full range of tort remedies
extended to all plaintiffs by Bowman and Lockhart.
HI. IN MIDDLEKAUFF'S WAKE--INTENTIONAL TORT CLAIMS BY
EMPLOYEES AGAINST THEIR EMPLOYERS OR FELLOW EMPLOYEES
The Supreme Court of Virginia and lower courts recently
have issued a number of opinions involving intentional tort
claims by employees in addition to wrongful discharge actions.
For several years defendants have avoided common law liability
for intentional torts by successfully asserting that the plaintiffs
sole recourse is under the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Act.7 Recent decisions, however, suggest that the once formi-
dable exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is losing force as a defense to intentional tort claims.
The exclusivity rule establishes the Workers' Compensation
Act as the only source of compensation for employees whose
workplace injuries have three characteristics. 2  First, the
Workers' Compensation Commission has exclusive jurisdiction
over injuries that occur by "accident."" Second, this accidental
(N.D. Iowa 1994); Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 295, 299 (D. Me.
1985); Wehr v. Burrough, 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 619 F.2d
276 (3d Cir. 1980); Melley v. Gillette Corp., 475 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Mass. Ct. App.
1985).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
71. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 1995). The leading case sup-
porting the employer's position on this jurisdictional point was Haddon v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co., 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990), overruled by Lichtman v.
Knouf, 248 Va. 139, 445 S.E.2d 114 (1994).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-307 (Repl. Vol. 1995). See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101
(Repl. Vol. 1995) (defining "injury" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act as
an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment"). This
statute must be read together with § 65.2-307, which provides that,
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee when his em-
ployer and he have accepted the provisions of this title respectively to
pay and accept compensation on account of injury or death by accident
shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his person-
al representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or
otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-307 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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injury must have arisen "in the course of... employment."74
Third, the injury must have arisen "out of employment."75 Al-
though a plaintiff whose injury fails to satisfy one or more of
these three elements is not entitled to receive workers' compen-
sation benefits, she is free to pursue a common law action
against the employer or other tortfeasor.
The erosion of the exclusivity provision as an absolute de-
fense to intentional tort actions advanced in January 1994 with
Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance Co.," which focused upon the
injury "by accident" prong of the three-part jurisdictional test
set out above. In Middlekauff, a plurality of justices on the
Supreme Court of Virginia overruled Haddon v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance." The supreme court in Haddon had held that
the Workers' Compensation Act contained the exclusive remedy
for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 78 In
74. Id.
75. Id. The failure to prove any one of these three factors defeats coverage under
the Workers' Compensation Act. Snead v. Harbaugh, 241 Va. 524, 526, 404 S.E.2d 53,
54 (1991). The "arising out of' element is distinct from the requirement that the
injury also occur "in the course of" the employment. "Arising out of" employment
pertains to the etiology of the injury. The "in the course of" employment language
refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Briley v.
Farm Fresh, Inc., 240 Va. 194, 197, 396 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1990). Compare Metcalf v.
A.M. Express Moving, 230 Va. 464, 468, 339 S.E.2d 177, 180 (1986) (observing that
an injury occurs in the course of employment when it takes place "within the period
of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be expected to be, and
while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or is doing something
which is reasonably incidental thereto") with R & T Investments v. Johns, 228 Va.
249, 252, 321 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1984) (explaining that causal connection between inju-
ry and the employment is necessary for the injury to have arisen out of the employ-
ment).
76. 247 Va. 150, 439 S.E.2d 394 (1994). Prior to Middlekauff, the Supreme Court
of Virginia in Snead had arguably modified Haddon by holding that a "condition
causing disability or pain will not be considered an 'injury' for purposes of the Act
unless accompanied by a 'sudden obvious mechanical or structural change' in the
body." 241 Va. at 528, 404 S.E.2d at 55. The Snead court held that the plaintiff's
claim that his reputation had been damaged by the employer's defamatory remarks
was not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. See also Merillat Indus. v.
Parks, 246 Va. 429, 433, 436 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1993) (holding that an employee suffer-
ing from torn rotator cuff muscle due to cumulative, repetitive trauma is not entitled
to workers' compensation benefits because his condition resulted from neither an
injury by accident nor compensable disease within the meaning of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act).
77. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990), overruled by Lichtman v. Knouf, 248 Va.
139, 445 S.E.2d 114 (1994).
78. Id. at 399, 389 S.E.2d at 713-14.
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Middlekauff, the supreme court stood Haddon on its head by
holding that emotional distress gradually inflicted upon an
employee by her employer's verbal abuse over a period of many
months did not amount to an "injury by accident" within the
meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act. 9 The statutory
terms "injury by accident" require a sudden, precipitating event
causing immediate harm.0 The Middlekauff plurality reasoned
that the trial court had erred when it sustained the employer's
plea of the exclusivity provision as a bar to the plaintiffs suit
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.8'
In Lichtman v. Knouf,8" a majority on the supreme court
confirmed the Middlekauff plurality's decision to "overrule
Haddon to the extent that it placed gradually incurred injuries
within the definition of 'injury by accident."83 Lichtman was
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by an
employee against two fellow employees." In an opinion issued
six months after Middlekauff, the court ruled that the plaintiffs
motion for judgment was not barred by the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act."
The supreme court revisited the "injury by accident" portion
of the three-part test for exclusive jurisdiction under the
Workers' Compensation Act in Williams v. Garraghty," a deci-
sion rendered in March 1995. David Garraghty, a prison war-
den for the Virginia Department of Corrections, sued a subordi-
nate, Gloria Williams, in the Circuit Court for Nottoway County
for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as
well as defamation." Garraghty alleged that he suffered men-
tal and emotional injuries, lost income and other damages be-
cause Williams wrote a memorandum falsely accusing him of
79. Middlekauff, 247 Va. at 154, 439 S.E.2d at 397.
80. Id. at 153, 439 S.E.2d at 396.
81. Id. at 154, 439 S.E.2d at 397.
82. 248 Va. 138, 445 S.E.2d 114 (1994).
83. Id at 140, 445 S.E.2d at 115.
84. Id. at 138, 445 S.E.2d at 114.
85. Id At least one circuit court has rejected an employer's claim that
Middlekauff and Lichtman should be applied prospectively to causes of action which
arise only after the date of the supreme court's opinion in Middlekauff. Fox v. Rich
Products Corp., 34 Va. Cir. 403, 406 (Winchester City 1994).
86. 249 Va. 224, 455 S.E.2d 209 (1995).
87. Id. at 227, 455 S.E.2d at 212.
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sexual harassment."5 The trial court allowed Garraghty to pro-
ceed with his defamation count, but sustained Williams' demur-
rer to all claims for emotional and mental distress damages.89
A jury awarded Garraghty compensatory and punitive damages
against Williams for defamation." The trial court, however, re-
mitted much of the punitive award. 1 Both parties appealed."
The question presented by Garraghty's appeal was whether
the trial court had erred in ruling that the exclusivity provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act barred him from proceeding
with his emotional distress claims. "The answer to this question
turns on whether Garraghty sustained an 'injury by accident,'"
Justice Stephenson wrote for the majority."
88. Id. at 229, 455 S.E.2d at 213. Garraghty sought to recover for his mental and
emotional suffering under two theories. First, Garraghty sought to prove that the de-
fendant was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Second, he claimed
damages for mental and emotional injuries he sustained as a direct result of the
defendant's defamation of him. Id. A defendant who commits an intentional tort such
as fraud or defamation may be liable for the plaintiffs mental and emotional injuries
even if the plaintiff fails to prove the elements of the independent tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Cartensen v. Chrisland Corp., 247 Va. 433, 446, 442
S.E.2d 660, 667-68 (1994) ("The criteria for sustaining a cause of action for intention-
al infliction of emotional distress are not the same as those applied to recovery of
emotional distress damages flowing from an independent tort."); Sea-Land Serv. v.
O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 354, 297 S.E.2d 647, 653 (1982).
89. Williams, 249 Va. at 227, 455 S.E.2d at 212.
90. Id. at 228, 445 S.E.2d at 212.
91. Id. at 237, 445 S.E.2d at 217.
92. Id. at 228, 445 S.E.2d at 212.
93. Id. at 238, 455 S.E.2d at 218.
In her separate appeal, .Williams challenged the jury's awards of compensatory
and punitive damages against her on Garraghty's defamation and insulting words
counts. The supreme court held that the trial court had correctly instructed the jury
that Williams' memorandum was entitled to a qualified privilege because it was a
communication made in the context of an employment relationship. Id. at 234, 455
S.E.2d at 216. The trial court also accurately informed jurors that they must deter-
mine whether Williams lost the privilege by acting with common law malice. Id. at
236, 455 S.E.2d at 216-17.
A qualified privilege, such as that which protects communications made in
connection with an employment relationship, is lost if the plaintiff proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant spoke the defamatory words with com-
mon-law malice. To establish common-law malice, the plaintiff must prove the defen-
dant acted out of spite or ill-will. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Project v.
Bade, 246 Va. 273, 276, 435 S.E.2d 131, 132 (1993) (reversing jury's verdict that the
discharged employee had proven that his former employer had acted with common-
law malice in writing a dismissal letter which accused him of deficient performance
and implied that he had engaged in illegal activities); Smalls v. Wright, 241 Va. 52,
55, 399 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1991); Great Coastal Express v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 154,
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The supreme court answered this question in the negative.
Citing Middlekauff, the court declared, "Generally, the damages
that flow from an action for intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress are not the result of an injury by
accident .... ." Similarly, the mental and emotional damages
Garraghty suffered as a result of Williams' defamatory memo-
randum did not constitute injuries by accident. 5
Common to Middlekauff, Lichtman and Garraghty was a
determination by the Supreme Court of Virginia in each case
that the employee's alleged injuries did not arise "by accident"
within the contemplation of the Workers' Compensation Act
exclusivity provision. In Richmond Newspapers v. Hazelwood,s"
the supreme court shifted its focus to whether the plaintiffs
injuries at the hands of a co-worker satisfied the "arising out
of... employment" requirement of the exclusivity rule. 7
Ricky Hazelwood filed suit against his employer, Richmond
Newspapers, for assault and battery after a fellow employee
"goosed" him on a series of occasions.9 " The Circuit Court for
the City of Richmond overruled Richmond Newspapers' plea
that the action was barred by section 65.2-307, the exclusivity
334 S.E.2d 846, 854 (1985); The Gazette v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 18, 325 S.E.2d 713,
727, cert. denied sub nor. Fleming v. Moore, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Preston v. Land,
220 Va. 118, 120-21, 255 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1979); Crawford & Co. v. Graves, 199 Va.
495, 499, 100 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1957); Taylor v. Grace, 166 Va. 138, 144, 184 S.E.
211, 213 (1936); Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins, 155 Va. 874, 903, 156 S.E. 429,
439 (1931).
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Williams upheld the jury's finding that be-
cause the defendant had acted with malice, her memorandum was not privileged.
Williams, 249 Va. at 237, 455 S.E.2d at 217. This finding by the jury also served to
support its award of punitive damages to Garraghty, since punitive damages are
justified when the tortfeasor acts with actual malice. Id. The supreme court, however,
rejected Garraghty's argument that the trial court had erred in remitting a large
portion of the punitive award. Giving "substantial weight' to the trial court's action,
the supreme court held that Williams' modest salary and financial assets rendered
the punitive award excessive and subject to remittitur. Id.
94. Williams, 249 Va. at 238, 455 S.E.2d at 218.
95. Id. at 239, 455 S.E.2d at 218. In his cross-appeal, Garraghty sought a new
trial only on his claims for mental and emotional suffering. Garraghty did not wish
to retry his defamation and insulting words counts, since he had prevailed on those
aspects of his suit. Refusing to grant Garraghty "such piecemeal relief," the supreme
court affirmed the trial courts judgment without ordering a new trial. Id. at 238-39,
455 S.E.2d at 218.
96. 249 Va. 369, 457 S.E.2d 56 (1995).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
98. Hazelwood, 249 Va. at 371, 457 S.E.2d at 57.
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provision.9 Hazelwood received a jury verdict against the em-
ployer for $140,000, which the trial court declined to set
aside."°
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.'' The court as-
sumed, "without deciding," that Hazelwood's injury was the
result of an "accident" within the scope of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act.0 2 Both parties conceded, moreover, that the
injury arose in the "course of the employment."' 3 Accordingly,
Hazelwood's claim was barred by the Workers' Compensation
Act if his injury also arose "out of employment," the third prong
of the three-part jurisdictional test under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act.'" 4
The supreme court held that the goosings did not arise out of
Hazelwood's employment because they hardly furthered the
employer's business.0 5 Goosings are personal assaults, direct-
ed against the employee as an individual rather than as an em-
ployee. Thus, even if the goosings were deemed injuries arising
by accident in the "course" of employment, the trial court had
properly overruled the employer's plea of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act exclusivity provision. Because the goosings did not
also arise "out" of his employment, Hazelwood could pursue a
common law action against Richmond Newspapers.'
IV. OTHER INTENTIONAL TORT CLAIMS BY EMPLOYEES
The judicial opinions discussed in the foregoing sections of
this article apply, and in some instances extend, tort principles
articulated by the Supreme Court of Virginia in its two water-
shed opinions from 1994, Lockhart and Middlekauff. During the
year under review, state and federal courts in Virginia also de-
99. Id. at 375, 457 S.E.2d at 59.
100. Id. at 371, 457 S.E.2d at 57.
101. Id. at 375, 457 S.E.2d at 59.
102. Id. at 372, 457 S.E.2d at 58.
103. Id.
104. Id. This narrow reading of the "arising out of employment" requirement is
also reflected in other decisions handed down last year by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. Lipsey v. Case, 248 Va. 59, 61-62, 445 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1994); Taylor v. Mobile
Corp., 248 Va. 101, 107, 444 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1994).
105. Hazelwood, 249 Va. at 375, 457 S.E.2d at 59.
106. Id.
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livered decisions concerning employment torts that did not
directly implicate either Lockhart or Middlekauff. Several of
these opinions provide guidance on the statute of limitations
applicable to tort claims for wrongful discharge.
In McBride v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authori-
ty, °7 the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia concluded that a defamation action is governed by
Virginia's one-year statute of limitations. Herbert McBride had
served as director of Roanoke's housing authority for several
years before he was fired."0 8 McBride then filed suit against
the housing authority and its chairman on a number of theo-
ries, including defamation."9 McBride alleged that the em-
ployer had defamed him on a series of occasions over the course
of two years."0 This campaign to sully McBride's name culmi-
nated with his dismissal, when the defendants announced pub-
licly that McBride's termination was "based on unsatisfactory
job performance.""'
The court granted the defendants' summary judgment."
Any cause of action for defamation based on statements made
more than one year prior to the date McBride filed suit were
time-barred, the court held." To the extent that McBride's
107. 871 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Va. 1994).
108. Id. at 887.
109. Id. at 888. McBride also brought claims for deprivation of procedural due
process, First Amendment violations and breach of contract, all of which were dis-
missed on summary judgment.
110. Id. at 888.
111. Id. at 891.
112. Id. at 892.
113. Id. at 891. Other recent opinions reinforce the conventional wisdom that em-
ployees should bring defamation actions within one year of the date they are harmed.
Purcell v. Tidewater Constr. Corp. 250 Va. 93, 95, 458 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1995) (dic-
tum); Tenant v. American Home Products, 34 Va. Cir. 256, 259 (Richmond City 1994);
see Morrissey v. William Morrow Co., 739 F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied
469 U.S. 1216 (1985) ("[T]he Virginia Supreme Court has consistently applied the
one-year statute of limitations in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 to defamation actions").
Although two circuit courts have held that the two year statute of limitations applies
to defamation actions, Massie v. Home Interiors, 27 Va. Cir. 492, 493-94 (Roanoke
County 1987), and Via v. O'Donnell, 27 Va.Cir. 433, 445 (Roanoke City 1982), the
clear majority of Virginia trial courts have held that the one-year statute governs.
See, e.g., Welch v. Kennedy Piggly Wiggly Stores, 63 Bankr. 888, 897 (W.D. Va.
1986); Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp., 480 F. Supp. 364, 376 (E.D. Va. 1979); Brown
v. Holland, 17 Va. Cir. 298, 299 (Fairfax County 1989); Ellison v. St. Mary's Hosp., 8
Va. Cir. 330, 334 (Henrico County 1987); Marshall v. Medical Facilities of Am., 6
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action was based on the housing authority's public announce-
ment of his departure, it was timely but meritless. The
authority's statement that McBride's termination was "based on
unsatisfactory job performance" was not defamatory, the court
held."4 No evidence suggested the statement was false and
truth is an absolute defense. Moreover, allegations of unsatis-
factory performance in employment are insufficiently harmful to
one's reputation to constitute defamation, the court de-
clared."5
The catch-all statute of limitations also figured in Singer v.
Dungan."' In Singer, the plaintiff was president of a corpora-
tion in which he also owned stock." The plaintiff won a jury
verdict on his claim that the corporation's directors had
breached their fiduciary duties by diluting his stock." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
on the ground that the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary claim was
barred by the one year catch-all limitations period contained in
section 8.01-248."9
Va.Cir. 410, 410 (Lynchburg City 1986); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 3
Va. Cir. 143, 144 (Alexandria City 1983); Beasley v. Kayo Oil Co., 3 Va. Cir. 119,
119 (Chesterfield County 1983); Moon v. CBS, 7 Va. Cir. 68, 70 (Richmond City
1981); Gaines v. Safeway Stores, 7 Va. Cir. 468, 469 (Richmond City 1977).
In any event, the General Assembly during its 1995 legislative session made
clear that actions which accrue on or after July 1, 1995, for defamation, libel, slander
and insulting words are governed by a one year limitations period. VA. CODE ANN. §§
8.01-247.1, -248 (Cum. Supp. 1995). In the same bill, the General Assembly increased
from one to two years the catch-all statute of limitations codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-246, at least for causes of action which accrue on or after July 1, 1995. Id.
114. 871 F. Supp. at 892.
115. Id. at 891.
116. 45 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 824.
118. Id. at 826.
119. Id. at 827. Singer is consistent with other decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in recent years concerning the statute of
limitations applicable to breach of fiduciary duty claims. See RTC v. Everhart, 37
F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 401-02 (4th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994); LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
830 F.2d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1065 (1988). Similarly, sever-
al courts have concluded that the catch-all statute of limitations applies to wrongful
discharge claims of various kinds. Purcell v. Tidewater Constr. Corp. 250 Va. 93, 96,
458 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1995) (holding that one-year catch-all statute applies to suits by
employees alleging that they were wrongfully discharged in retaliation for filing work-
ers compensation act claims); Guiden v. Southeastern Public Serv. Auth., 760 F.
Supp. 1171, 1179 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 946 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1991); Deasy v.
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In Saliba v. Exxon Corp., ° the plaintiff, Saliba, had been
in-house counsel to Hunt Oil Company and its-Yemeni subsid-
iary, Yemen Hunt. Saliba entered into a confidentiality agree-
ment with Yemen Hunt stating that he would avoid economic
activities contrary to the employer's interests for two years
after termination of his employment.'2 During Saliba's two-
year tenure with Yemen Hunt, the oil company formed a part-
nership with a Yemen-based subsidiary of Exxon Corp.' The
purpose of the Hunt-Exxon partnership was oil exploration in
Yemen.'
After Hunt fired him, Saliba was retained by the Government
of Yemen under a three-month employment agreement.'
Saliba's job entailed advising the Yemeni government on mat-
ters related to the oil explorations of the Hunt-Exxon partner-
ship.' Hunt protested to Yemeni officials that Saliba's repre-
sentation of the government conflicted with his confidentiality
agreement." Hunt also informed government representatives
that it was embroiled in a declaratory judgment action in Texas
state court against Saliba over the lawfulness of his termina-
tion as in-house counsel. 7 Yemen elected not to renew its le-
gal services contract with Saliba at the end of the initial, three
month term.'
In a suit filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, Saliba alleged that Hunt and Ex-
xon had conspired against him and tortiously interfered with
his employment contract with the Yemeni government. 9 The
court, however, granted the oil firms summary judgment on
Maryview Hosp., Law No. 92-846, Oct. 19, 1994 (Portsmouth City 1994); Wright v.
Buchanan Pump & Serv. Co., 22 Va. Cir. 396, 396 (Wise County 1991); Crowder v.
Chap Stick Co., 6 Va. Cir. 115, 115 (Lynchburg City 1984). Effective July 1, 1995,
the catch-all statute will provide a two year limitations period for these actions. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-247.1, -248 (Cum. Supp. 1995); see discussion supra note 113.
120. 865 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. Va. 1994).
121. Id. at 308.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 309.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Saliba also alleged that the oil companies had violated antitrust statutes.
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both counts."' Saliba's tortious interference with contract the-
ory failed for two reasons. First, Saliba could not show that the
defendants used "improper methods" when they allegedly inter-
fered with his employment contract with the Yemeni govern-
ment.31 Proof that the defendants' interference was improper
as well as intentional was necessary because Saliba's continued
employment relationship with the Yemeni government beyond
the original three-month term was merely prospective."' As a
second, alternative ground for its rejection of Saliba's tortious
interference count, the court held that any intrusion by the de-
fendants was justified or privileged." The financial stake of
Hunt and Exxon in their Yemeni oil venture rendered privi-
leged the oil companies' complaints to Yemen's government."s
The court also articulated two bases for its dismissal of
Saliba's statutory conspiracy claim under section 18.2-499 of the
Virginia Code."' As a threshold matter, the court held that
130. Id. at 314. Applying Texas law, the court held that a release executed by
Saliba which relieved the Hunt-Exxon partnership from liability arising out of the
Texas litigation also released the general partners from liability. Although this conclu-
sion was dispositive, the court proceeded to reject Saliba's claims for relief on other
grounds as well. Id. at 311.
131. Id. at 312.
132. Id. The tort of intentional interference with an at-will contract has four ele-
ments: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship; (2) knowledge on the part
of the interferer of that contractual relationship; (3) use of improper methods in the
intentional interference causing a termination of the contract; and (4) resultant dam-
age to the party whose contract has been disrupted. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. v.
DePew, 247 Va. 240, 245-46, 440 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1994); see also Allen Realty Corp.
v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 449, 318 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1984). This same test almost cer-
tainly applies to claims for intentional interference with a prospective contract.
Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 226-27, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1987) (citing Allen Real-
ty for the proposition that a "cause of action for intentional interference with prospec-
tive contract arises when interference [is] both intentional and improper"). But see
Krantz v. Air Line Pilots As'n, 245 Va. 202, 209, 427 S.E.2d 326, 330 (1993) (dis-
cussing elements of intentional interference with a prospective contract but failing to
mention improper methods requirement).
133. Saliba, 865 F. Supp. at 312-13.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 313-14. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499(A) (Cum. Supp. 1995) provides in
part,
Any two or more persons who combine, associate, agree, mutually under-
take or concert together for the purpose of (i) willfully and maliciously
injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any
means whatever or (ii) willfully and maliciously compelling another to do
or perform any act against his will, or preventing or hindering another
from doing or performing any lawful act, shall be jointly and severally
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Saliba had failed to establish "a combination of two or more
persons," a requisite element under the civil conspiracy stat-
utes." Exxon and Hunt were incapable of conspiring with one
another because they were general partners in the Yemeni oil
partnership. "Where the alleged co-conspirators are the two
general partners in a partnership, acting within the scope of
partnership affairs, only one entity exists-the Partnership." 7
Even if Saliba had established the requisite combination of two
or more persons, the court continued, no evidence suggested
that the defendants had acted for the purpose of maliciously
injuring Saliba in his business. 8 To satisfy the malicious in-
tent requirement, the court observed, the defendants' conduct
"must be directly aimed toward damaging" the plaintiffs busi-
ness, reputation, or profession." 9
V. CONCLUSION
Two decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia in early
1994, Middlekauff and Lockhart, continued to dominate Virginia
employment law between June of that year and spring 1995.
Trial courts struggled in the past year to apply the public poli-
cy exception to the at-will rule after Lockhart, the most impor-
tant employment discrimination decision by the Supreme Court
of Virginia this century. The General Assembly responded to
Lockhart with a new piece of legislation that represents an
attempt to limit the decision severely.
Another noteworthy development in the year under study was
the continued weakening of the Workers' Compensation Act
exclusivity provision. In the relatively brief period since it
guilty of Class 1 misdemeanor. Such punishment shall be in addition to
any civil relief recoverable under § 18.2-500.
136. Saliba, 865 F. Supp. at 313.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 314. The district court probably imposed an undue burden upon Saliba
when it required him to prove that the defendants acted with actual, pointed malice.
In Commercial Business Systems, Inc. v. Bellsouth Services, the Supreme Court of
Virginia, interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 (Cum. Supp. 1994), declared, "[Wie
do not think that, as a general proposition, the conspiracy statutes require proof that
a conspirator's primary and overriding purpose is to injure another in his trade or
business. The statutes do not so provide, and such a requirement would place an
unreasonable burden on a plaintiff." 249 Va. 39, 47, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1993).
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handed down Middlekauff, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
on a series of occasions held that intentional tort actions by
employees are not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act.
Virginia courts during the twelve months under review did
not hand down any decisions that approach in significance
Lockhart or Middlekauff. Still, the opinions surveyed here con-
firm that the direction of workplace litigation in Virginia is
toward intentional tort claims and away from contract theories
of recovery.
